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ABORTION AFTER WEBSTER 
The most heralded decision of the 1988 Term was the abortion 
decision, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. I After the deci-
sion came down on the last day of the Term, there was an avalanche 
of public reaction. Pro-life forces heralded the decision as the de-
mise of Roe v. Wade, while pro-choice advocates lamented the re-
turn to the pre-Roe era of "back alley abortions." Both responses 
were exaggerated. Webster actually is notable as much for the 
Court's caution and indecision as anything else. Though it may be 
a sign of larger things to come, the decision itself actually made 
only small changes in existing abortion law. 
In addition, advocates on both sides of the issue may have 
overestimated the ability of the legal system to suppress abortion. 
A recent study by a leading expert in criminal law suggests that, no 
matter what the Supreme Court does, the effect on the number of 
abortions is likely to be minimal. 
Four provisions of the Missouri abortion statute were before 
the Supreme Court in Webster. The Court found it unnecessary to 
pass on two provisions-a preamble declaring that human life be-
gins at conception and a prohibition on the use of public funds to 
encourage abortion. Two other provisions were reviewed on the 
merits and upheld. One of these barred abortions by public employ-
ees or at public hospitals. The other required viability testing for 
abortions after the twentieth week of pregnancy. 
In assessing the impact of Webster, the starting place is obvi-
ously the opinions themselves. The lead opinion was written by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and was joined in its entirety by Justices 
White and Kennedy. He was also joined by O'Connor and Scalia, 
making his the majority opinion, on three points: First, the 
"human life" preamble might raise constitutional issues depending 
on how it was applied by the state courts, but since its future appli-
cation was entirely speculative, the question was not ripe for deci-
sion. Second, limiting abortions by government employees or at 
government hospitals was constitutional. This provision did not 
place any new barrier in the way of a woman seeking an abortion, 
but rather denied her the affirmative assistance of the government in 
obtaining the abortion. Hence, this provision did not violate Roe, 
I. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). 
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which only prohibits the government from adding to the woman's 
burdens. Third, the dispute about the ban on the use of government 
funds for abortion counseling was moot, because the plaintiffs had 
essentially decided not to pursue it on appeal. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist spoke only for a plurality on what 
turned out to be the crucial issue in the case, that of viability test-
ing. The statute was somewhat ambiguous in its terms. The first 
sentence of the statute says that whenever a doctor has reason to 
believe that the fetus is older than nineteen weeks, "the physician 
shall first determine if the unborn child is viable "using . . . that 
degree of care ... commonly exercised by the ordinarily skillful ... 
physician." The second sentence goes on to say that "[i]n making 
this determination of viability, the physician shall perform" tests for 
fetal age, weight, and lung maturity. The ambiguity concerns 
whether the tests are mandatory. The second sentence seems to say 
that certain tests must always be performed. The first sentence can 
be read to leave the doctor discretion based on reasonable medical 
judgment. 
Rehnquist adopted the less restrictive reading, under which the 
doctor does not need to test if he determines that the tests would be 
"irrelevant to determining viability or even dangerous to the mother 
and the fetus .... " Given this reading, Rehnquist found the statute 
to be reasonable. While a 20-week fetus is not viable, there is a 
four-week zone of uncertainty in determining the length of preg-
nancy, and a 24-week fetus might be viable. But even though it was 
reasonable, the statute conflicted with Roe in Rehnquist's view, be-
cause it frequently burdened abortions where in fact the fetus was 
not viable, thereby violating the Roe trimester system. (Under the 
trimester system, the state can regulate abortions to protect poten-
tial human life only in the third trimester of pregnancy.) 
This brings us to the crucial portion of Rehnquist's opinion, his 
rejection of the Roe trimester system. He rejected the trimester sys-
tem because it spawned "a web of legal rules that have become in-
creasingly intricate, resembling a code of regulations rather than a 
body of constitutional doctrine." Also, the state's interest in pre-
serving potential life does not spring into existence at the point of 
viability, but exists throughout pregnancy. The woman's right to 
abortion cannot be balanced against fetal life "once and for all by 
reference only to the calendar." 
Does this mean that Roe is overruled? Clearly, no--or at least, 
not yet. In the penultimate paragraph of the opinion, Rehnquist 
pointed out that Webster is distinguishable from Roe because Mis-
souri banned abortions only after viability. "This case therefore af-
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fords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe ... and we leave it 
undisturbed." 
There is even some language in Rehnquist's opinion that seems 
to reaffirm Roe, or at least the basic holding that the right to abor-
tion enjoys some constitutional protection. Consider the following 
two passages: 
The experience of the Court in applying Roe v. Wade in later cases suggests to us 
that there is wisdom in not necessarily attempting to elaborate the abstract differ-
ences between a "fundamental right" to abortion. as the Court described it in Ak-
ron, a "limited fundamental constitutional right." which Justice Blackmun's dissent 
today treats Roe as having established, or a liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause. which we believe it to be. 
• • • 
The dissent's suggestion that legislative bodies, in a Nation where more than half of 
our population is women, will treat our decision today as an invitation to enact 
abortion regulation reminiscent of the dark ages not only misreads our views but 
does scant justice to those who serve in such bodies and the people who elected 
them. [citations deleted, emphasis added]. 
Look again at what Rehnquist was saying. First, abortion is "a lib-
erty interest protected by the Due Process Clause." Second, al-
lowing complete bans on abortion "misreads our views." In short, 
it seems, Rehnquist recognized some sort of constitutional right to 
abortion. 
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion did not go even as far 
as Rehnquist's. She agreed with him that viability testing is re-
quired by the statute only where consistent with good medical prac-
tice. Given that reading, she found no conflict with the Roe 
trimester system, and therefore no reason to reevaluate that system. 
"No decision of this Court has held that the State may not directly 
promote its interest in potential life when viability is possible. Quite 
the contrary." In short, she said, "[i]t is clear to me that requiring 
the performance of examinations and tests useful to determining 
whether a fetus is viable, when viability is possible, and when it 
would not be medically imprudent to do so, does not impose an 
undue burden on a woman's abortion decision." 
Of all the Justices, only Scalia spoke in favor of a direct over-
ruling of Roe. He lambasted his fellow conservatives for avoiding 
the issue. He agreed with the dissent that Rehnquist's opinion "ef-
fectively would overrule Roe v. Wade." He added: "I think that 
should be done, but would do it more explicitly. Since today we 
contrive to avoid doing it, and indeed to avoid almost any decision 
of national import, I need not set forth my reasons .... " The tone 
of Scalia's concurrence is harsh-as harsh as one might have ex-
pected from a dissenting, not concurring, opinion. He said that 
O'Connor's views in her concurring opinion "cannot be taken seri-
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ously." He was only slightly gentler about Rehnquist's approach. 
"The result of our vote today is that only minor problematical as-
pects of Roe will be reconsidered, unless one expects State legisla-
tures to adopt provisions whose compliance with Roe cannot even 
be argued with a straight face." He closed by saying that the Court 
had taken the "least responsible" possible approach to the case. 
Justice Blackmon's dissent begins by saying that Roe and "the 
fundamental constitutional right of women to decide whether to ter-
minate a pregnancy, survive but are not secure." "Never in my 
memory," he said, "has a plurality announced a judgment of this 
Court that so foments disregard for the law and for our standing 
decisions." And so, he said, "I fear for the future. I fear for the 
liberty and equality of the millions of women who have lived and 
come of age in the 16 years since Roe was decided. I fear for the 
integrity of, and public esteem for, this Court." Justice Blackmun 
then criticized the Court's handling of the viability issue and de-
fended at length the approach adopted by the Court in Roe. He was 
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. 
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent. He rejected Rehn-
quist's reading of the viability provision, and argued instead that it 
required viability testing even where testing would be pointless or 
dangerous. He also argued that the "human life" declaration vio-
lated the establishment clause of the Constitution, because it was 
only based on a theological view about the beginning of life. 
At this point, perhaps it is worth "counting heads" with re-
spect to the current status of Roe. Four Justices (the dissenters) 
would uphold Roe. Justice O'Connor is silent on the issue. Three 
Justices (the plurality) want to modify the trimester system but 
seem to recognize some possible constitutional right to an abortion. 
Only one Justice (Scalia) wants to throw Roe on the scrap heap. 
As to the specific issues in the case, the direct impact of the 
decision is minor. The Court did not make much new law in its 
ruling about abortions by public facilities and employees. The 
Court had previously held that public financing could be denied for 
abortions; Webster merely took that holding one step further in a 
predictable direction. The viability-testing provision may well be 
consistent with Roe, as Justice O'Connor argued. Even if it is not, it 
has little practical importance. Less than one percent of all abor-
tions are performed after the twentieth week, and even then, the 
statute requires viability testing only when the physician finds it to 
be medically justifiable. 
Although the press billed Webster as a tremendous victory for 
pro-life sources, it could equally well have been called a startling 
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defeat. They obtained precisely one vote to overrule Roe outright. 
Justice O'Connor, whose vote is clearly necessary if Roe is to be 
overruled, seemed to be very anxious indeed to avoid that step. 
Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy seemed surprisingly gingerly in 
their handling of the issue, and even-as I noted earlier-can be 
read to be reaffirming some aspects of Roe. Indeed, as a technical 
matter, Roe is completely unmodified. Since there were only four 
votes to modify it in any respect, it remains binding on lower court 
judges. 
How did this get to be a "big win" for the pro-life movement? 
Everyone outside the Court had an interest in exaggerating the ef-
fect of the case. Pro-life advocates wanted to be able to claim a big 
victory. Pro-choice advocates wanted to rally the troops. And the 
press wanted the decision to be as exciting as possible. These inter-
ests all converged in the direction of "hyping" the impact of 
Webster. 
This is not to say that the future of Roe is secure. After an-
nouncing the decision in Webster, the Court granted cert. in three 
cases involving other aspects of abortion regulation. These cases 
give the Court another opportunity to whittle away at abortion 
rights. They also give Justice Scalia another opportunity to try to 
sell his colleagues on more drastic action. If anything, however, his 
jabs at O'Connor may well backfire, making her less likely to move 
in his direction. 
My crystal ball is no better than yours, but I see no reason to 
expect the Court to abolish the constitutional right to abortion in 
these cases. What I do expect-and what almost everyone has ex-
pected for at least the past three years-is that the Court will allow 
greater state regulation (not including complete bans on abortion). 
If President Bush gets to make some additional appointments, per-
haps the balance of power will shift in Scalia's direction. Or per-
haps not. A Bush appointee might well share some of the qualms 
that Kennedy and O'Connor seem to feel about a total overruling of 
Roe. Stevens and Blackmun, let us recall, were also Republican 
appointees. 
Even if Roe is overruled someday, abortions-for better or 
worse-will not come to a halt. According to a Newsweek poll, 
only 17 percent of the public favors a complete ban on abortion. 
Newsweek also counted at least ten states that are unlikely to re-
strict abortion in the near future, so women who can afford a bus 
ride to those states will still be able to get abortions. 
Moreover, even a total ban on abortions might be relatively 
ineffective. John Kaplan is one of the nation's leading criminal law 
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experts. In a recent article, he contends that abortion bans can be 
expected to have minimal effects, even apart from the likelihood of 
interstate travel to get abortions. The most reliable studies show 
that the number of illegal abortions before Roe was about 75 per-
cent of the number of legal abortions now. Today, illegal abortions 
would be much safer and cheaper, because the technology for per-
forming abortions has improved greatly since Roe. Criminal en-
forcement of abortion laws was always very difficult, and would be 
more difficult today because of broad public support for abortion. 
For these reasons, Professor Kaplan contends, bans on abortion 
would be largely a symbolic victory for the pro-life groups, but 
would have limited practical effects.2 
Restrictive abortion laws would prevent some abortions, and 
they would place a heavy psychological (and sometimes economic) 
burden on women who obtain abortions despite those laws. The 
importance of symbolism on such fundamental issues also should 
not be underestimated. But the true stakes are less than both sides 
of the dispute claim. 
In any event, we are a long way from a constitutional regime in 
which complete bans on abortion will be allowed. Apart from Jus-
tice Scalia, no one on the Supreme Court seems to be in any hurry 
to get there. 
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